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ABSTRACT: Identifying the determinants of success in communicating scientific information for use in 
policymaking has been a topic of longstanding interest for many fields. Perceptions of message and messenger 
credibility are recognized in many disciplines as key to information receptivity, and subsequent changes in 
attitudes, by decision-makers. Bias also appears as a component of credibility, but is not theoretically well-
defined, and its effects can appear inconsistent. This study—comprised of interviews with congressional staff 
members with energy, environment, and science portfolios (n=16)—finds that perceptions of bias and expertise 
play a critical role in the way in which policymakers evaluate scientific information sources, building on early 
research on credibility and opinion change. 
KEYWORDS: bias, Congress, credibility, expertise, policymakers, science communication, staff 
1. INTRODUCTION 
How to foster the use of scientific information by policymakers has been a longstanding topic 
of interest for many academic disciplines and communication practitioners alike (Jasanoff, 
1990; Lach, List, Steel, & Shindler, 2003; Morgan & Peha, 2003). Increased interest 
worldwide in the practice of evidence-based policymaking (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017) has 
only reinforced attention to this research area. The purpose of this study is to understand how 
legislative staff for members of the U.S. Congress assess credibility in considering scientific 
information. This highly politically polarized setting presents a unique context for the 
communication of information (Whiteman, 1995).  
Scholars have sought to explain the constituents of credibility for thousands of years; 
Aristotle attributed a source’s credibility, or ethos, to intelligence, character, and goodwill 
(Cooper, 1932). Yet, numerous methods and theoretical approaches have yet to successfully 
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explicate the construct. McComas and Trumbo (2001) explained that, “an agreed-upon, 
generalized measure of credibility has yet proved elusive” (p. 468). A recent review found that 
little has changed since McComas and Trumbo’s assessment, faulting researchers for poor 
attempts at operationalizing credibility for the purpose of theory-building (Hellmueller & 
Trilling, 2012). However, other scholars have argued that a generalized definition may not be 
achievable; what constitutes credibility is situationally dependent (Cash et al., 2002). For 
example, policy contexts generally involve factors at the group and/or institutional level 
operating within long timeframes (Lemos, Kirchhoff, & Ramprasad, 2012). The wealth of 
credibility literature from individual-level cross-sectional studies on communication is unlikely 
to capture these dimensions.  
Societal tensions over whether scientific information is—or should be—free of social 
values adds an additional facet of complexity to its communication within political contexts. 
The authority of science rests upon perceived objectivity, which is complicated when science 
enters the realm of policy. Jasanoff (2012) explained that, “with science more and more being 
produced in the service of social ends, the possibility of bias is far more evident, and the 
grounds of expert authority correspondingly in greater need of rearticulation” (p. 154). Because 
disinterestedness is believed to be integral to perceptions of the authority of scientific 
expertise, it would be expected to serve as a criterion for scientific credibility. However, other 
literatures that have tried to describe information flow in the evolution of policy within and 
between coalitions point to advantages of information source interestedness—as opposed to 
disinterestedness—as long as the group and source share common values and policy 
preferences. Due to the role of perceived bias in relationship to the authority of science and the 
potential for conflict between coalitions as issue preferences mature, we look to understand 
perceptions of source bias by congressional staff members in their assessments of scientific 
information, and whether lack of objectivity has different effects depending on the state of 
development of an office’s policy position.  
Through interviews with congressional staff members (n=16), this study takes a 
qualitative, contextual approach to investigate how scientific credibility is perceived and 
assessed by legislative staff who work on the issues of energy, natural resources/environment, 
and science. We ask not only how congressional staff members evaluate the credibility of 
scientific sources and information, but what role perceived bias plays in their information use. 
Are “biased” sources considered less helpful as providers of scientific information? And does 
the status of the office’s policy position on an issue affect preferences for sources? This 
research compares conceptualizations of credibility and bias from the fields of rhetoric, 
communication, and public policy, with the goal of reducing conceptual ambiguity in these 
constructs. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Across diverse literatures, perceptions of source credibility have emerged as key factors in 
communicating expert information. For example, the art of rhetoric is vital to the structure of 
policy debates (Condor, Tileagă, & Billig, 2013). Rhetoricians have pointed to authoritative 
proof based on the credentials of the source as a warrant for belief (Ehninger & Brockriede, 
1978). Communication scholars have demonstrated that perceptions of source credibility lead 
to greater message receptivity and correspondingly higher levels of attitudinal and behavioral 
change (Pornpitakpan, 2004). And public policy and political science researchers claim that its 
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effects lead all the way to policy change, and that it “has long been the assumed currency of 
scientists doing policy-relevant research” (Cash et al., 2003, p. 3). All of this evidence should 
be instructive, but what constitutes credibility, to whom, and under what circumstances varies 
across contexts, resulting in conceptual ambiguity and even occasionally contradictory results 
(Posner, McKenzie, & Ricketts, 2016).   
  
2.1 Defining Credibility 
 
Other authors have undertaken comprehensive efforts to review the breadth of literature on 
information and source credibility, its operationalization, and effects on opinion change in 
ways that are not possible here (Hellmueller & Trilling, 2012; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Wilson & 
Sherrell, 1993). For the purposes of informing this paper’s research questions, we simply wish 
to point out inconsistencies in its definition across and within the literatures from rhetoric, 
communication, and public policy, and to draw attention to some similarities. While none of 
these fields have developed consistent measures of credibility, some dimensions of the 
construct appear in all three, such as expertise and trustworthiness.        
Rhetoric. The question of how to most effectively make an argument based on expert 
authority has been an unresolved debate for at least 2,000 years, yet recommendations from 
rhetoricians in recent decades remain conflicting (Walton, 1997). In establishing the authority 
of an expert for the purposes of making a claim, Ehninger and Brockriede (1978) argue for 
three criteria: expertise in the field, access to the relevant information, and (reasonable) lack of 
bias. In distilling the rhetoric literature, Walton (1997) expands the set to six: expertise, 
relevance of the field, import of the opinion to the argument, trustworthiness, consistency with 
other experts, and supporting evidence. Notably the first set describes source characteristics 
while the second expands to include characteristics of both messenger and message. 
Communication. One of the first problems in confronting the definition of credibility is 
credibility of what or whom—the message or the messenger? Attempts to distinguish between 
credibility judgements for sources versus their messages have found that these twin aspects of 
the construct are heavily intertwined (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Slater & Rouner, 1996), to be 
deemed at times almost indistinguishable (Cronkhite & Liska, 1976). Communication scholars 
have often used factor analysis to deduce underlying dimensions of credibility (McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999; McCroskey & Young, 1981). Some authors have blamed the method—a 
mathematical means of categorizing measures according to similar respondent ratings—as one 
of the reasons that the study of credibility has been largely unproductive (Cronkhite & Liska, 
1976). One of the most widely used measures of source credibility posits three dimensions: 
competence, goodwill, and trustworthiness (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). But the construct has 
also been operationalized along other dimensions, such as expertise and lack of bias (Slater & 
Rouner, 1996).  
Public policy. In a series of oft-cited case studies on the effects of science and 
technology on sustainable development, public policy and political science researchers found 
that credibility—along with legitimacy and salience—are the hallmarks of knowledge systems 
that promote sustainable development policies (Cash et al., 2003). Other researchers since have 
found no impact of the credibility of knowledge on policy within the domain of ecosystem 
services (Posner et al., 2016). Cash and colleagues (2002) defined credibility not only as 
informational qualities of plausibility and accuracy, but the nature of the source as trustworthy 
and believable. But the authors also recognized that credibility of information is hard to 
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ascertain, that the people who produce the information often serve as a proxy for informational 
credibility, that perceptions of credibility are not static, but can evolve over time, and that they 
are not universal, but “involve actor-specific judgments using different criteria and standards” 
(Cash et al., 2002, p. 4). Though there can be cases of shared public evaluation, “salience, 
credibility, and legitimacy are perceived and judged differently by different audiences (e.g., the 
U.S. Congress, farmers in Zimbabwe, or fishers in Nova Scotia)” (p. 4). Work building upon 
this nuanced definition has since operationalized credibility in different ways. Other authors 
within this field have sought to distinguish source from information, creating discrete 
categories of informational credibility and source trust (Lemos et al., 2012), or derived narrow, 
context-specific interpretations of credibility, such as “data quality, calculations, visual display, 
and scientific validity” (White et al., 2010, p. 226). 
 
RQ1: How do policymakers (congressional staff members) define the credibility of scientific sources 
and information? 
2.2 Perceived Source Bias 
 
Philosophers debate whether science can—or should—be values-free (Douglas, 2009). 
Jasanoff (2012) noted that “as long as scientists could claim objective access to nature’s laws, 
on the basis of observations unbiased by personal or political interests, that alone was 
sufficient to underwrite their expertise” (p. 154). Disinterestedness, or objectivity and lack of 
bias, has been said to be one of the imperatives of science (Merton, 1973).  
Like credibility itself, the role of perceived bias in credibility and trust appears across 
multiple disciplines, but inconsistently, and is not theoretically well-defined. Bias and 
objectivity were included in 25% and 4% of a sample of 68 measures of semantic dimensions 
of source credibility, respectively—less frequently than the semantic dimensions of “accurate” 
(50%), “believable” (35%), “fair” (35%), and “trustworthy” (60%) (Hellmueller & Trilling, 
2012). Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) describe bias as “factors that are perceived to influence 
the algebraic difference between the source’s report and the true state of nature” (p. 48). They 
use politics to illustrate an example: “a Republican might be a biased source of information 
about a Democrat who is running for office” (p. 48). Understandably, the range of those 
potential biasing factors could be quite broad. Moreover, the effects of bias on source 
credibility and persuasiveness can appear unpredictable.  
Lack of bias. When bias is included as a dimension of source credibility, typically it is 
as lack of bias, in alignment with traditional norms about scientific objectivity. In an analysis 
of the mediating effects of message quality on source credibility and belief change, Slater and 
Rouner (1996) measured credibility as perceived source expertise and lack of bias: “It seems 
self evident that if a message originates with, for example, an expert and objective person, that 
message should influence audience beliefs more than the same message from an inexpert and 
biased person,” the authors stated (p. 975). Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken (1978) tested two forms 
of bias on opinion change: bias derived from past experience, and bias in attempting to appeal 
to an audience’s interests. When the expert with a pro-business background, or with a speaking 
engagement to a pro-business audience, made pro-environmental statements (presumably 
countering their bias), they were identified as more unbiased, and were more persuasive, than 
when the expert with a pro-environmental background or pro-environmental audience made 
the same arguments. The authors found that when speakers were believed to be shaping their 
arguments to fit the interests of the audience, they were viewed as manipulative. In a later 
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study, they revealed a similar pattern between perceived lack of bias and opinion change 
(Wood & Eagly, 1981).  
As noted above, bias also appears in the rhetorical literature. One of the six tests of 
Walton (1997) for expert opinion is “trustworthiness,” which is then broken into source 
reliability: (lack of) bias, honesty, and conscientiousness (p. 217). Similarly, Ehninger and 
Brockriede (1978) include absence of bias in their criteria. But, interestingly, these authors 
qualify their inclusion of bias by saying that it should not necessarily disqualify an expert’s 
opinion. “It is acceptable for an expert to have bias, but what raises a critical question of 
personal reliability is the kind of situation where this bias is a critically bad bias, an obstacle to 
honest and credible testimony for one side over another” (Walton, 1997, p. 216). Ehninger and 
Brockriede note that the more expert a source in their field, and higher levels of access they 
have to information, by definition, the less “disinterested” in the topic they become: “An ideal 
authority is someone whose expertise and knowledge is high and whose partisanship is 
reasonably restrained” (p. 86). 
Direction of bias in relation to the judge. The cautionary notes from Cash and 
colleagues (2002) about the specificity of audiences in defining credibility raises the question 
of whether congressional staff members are unique in the ways that they consider scientific 
information. Advocacy organizations and lobbyists provide staff members with information to 
promote their preferred policies; information has recognized economic value that facilitates its 
transfer. This aspect of information sharing is documented by the theory of lobbying as 
legislative subsidy (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). The model explains the long-observed 
phenomenon that lobbyists work most frequently with the offices of members of Congress with 
whom they share support for policy goals—e.g. a shared interest and bias. An office’s 
involvement in a policy issue costs it scarce time and other resources. Lobbyists can affect the 
budget line calculation by providing research and expertise that lowers the price tag of the 
office’s efforts in achieving progress on an issue, potentially influencing which policy areas 
receive more attention. 
 According to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988), issue 
coalitions are built on a set of shared beliefs and policy positions that hierarchically progress 
from those that are resolute to those that can be negotiated within policy discourses: deep core 
beliefs reflecting fundamental value systems, near core beliefs expressive of values relative to 
the policy area, and secondary aspects specific to the subsystem. One of the central hypotheses 
of the ACF is that learning occurs easily within coalitions with shared belief systems and 
policy biases, and with difficulty across systems with conflicting biases. Some authors have 
espoused conceptualizing deep core beliefs as a form of worldviews, as described by Cultural 
Theory (CT) (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014). Motivated reasoning and 
biased assimilation—theories used within CT—could also explain resistance to belief change 
found with coalitions. 
Examples of bounded rationality in preferentially accepting—and using—information 
from sources with shared biases appear in a variety of theoretical areas and domains, even 
“blaps.” When study participants were given a choice whether to receive information on shape-
sorting into a randomly named category termed “blaps” from someone with politically similar 
views or someone who demonstrated expertise in sorting blaps, they chose the source with 
greater political similarity more frequently than the one with greater subject matter expertise 
(Marks, Copland, Loh, Sunstein, & Sharot, 2018). Both blap expertise and shared political bias 
affected opinion change, with accuracy in shape-sorting mediating the effect of perceived 
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political similarity. The authors claimed the finding was the result of the halo effect, in which 
preferences for a source in one area spill over into unrelated areas. 
The importance of assessing bias from the judge’s point of view appears in other cases 
as well—from conflict mediation to used car sales. Disinterested mediators have been 
traditionally thought to be perceived as more effective. Using game theory, Kydd (2003) 
demonstrated that only those mediators who are known to be biased in favor of the party with 
which they are communicating will be successful in getting them to make concessions. In the 
case of used car prices, the expertise of the source and their bias factored into evaluations of 
value of the vehicle (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979). Unbiased sources of great expertise carried 
the most weight, but the authors found the data to be suggestive of two other potentially 
systemic effects: 1) messages counter to expected biases increase the source’s impact (similar 
to the studies described above); and 2) sources with the same biases as the judge are more 
effective messengers. They explained that the variable effects of bias, due to both its absolute 
value and valence, may be one of the reasons that it has not been well captured in the literature 
on opinion change. 
 
RQ2: What sources of scientific information are seen by congressional staff members as unbiased, 
and how frequently are they considered helpful sources of usable information, compared to sources 
not identified as unbiased? 
2.3 Bias and Information Use for Policy 
Most studies of coalitions have been conducted with issues—and systems—that are mature, 
e.g. the actors have already formed allegiances around a preferred policy position (Ingold, 
Fischer, & Cairney, 2017). How coalitions form around evolving policy issues is much less 
clear (Ingold et al., 2017). In expanding the ACF to describe the way that scientific experts 
participate within policy subsystems, Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier (2010) described three 
types of subsystems in which these relationships would be expected to differ. In a unitary 
subsystem, experts are in agreement and serve as peripheral allies to the primary coalition; in 
collaborative systems, experts reconcile their scientific differences and serve peripherally as 
allies or opponents to coalitions; and in adversarial systems, experts disagree and take central 
roles as allies or opponents. While information flow between and within coalitions varies 
across each of these models, what remains consistent is that experts are expected to align with 
coalitions according to shared beliefs and policy preferences, e.g. biases. Ingold and Gschwend 
(2014) tested the hypotheses developed by Weible and colleagues (2010) for this typology and 
found that scientists could serve both as strategic political actors or as neutral brokers, but 
generally fell into the latter category, operating at the periphery of coalitions and/or subsystems 
with moderate ideological positions. To our knowledge, the specific role of scientists in 
emergent policy subsystems has yet to be studied. Initial research suggests the seeds of 
coalitions take the form of previous contacts (Ingold et al., 2017). 
The present study looks for differences in scientific information use in two different 
cases: 1) when the policy position of a congressional office in an area of science, energy, or 
environment is indeterminate; and 2) and when it is established. This distinction can be thought 
of as a rough indicator of the lack of identification with a policy coalition: the office, if not 
necessarily the issue, is in a nascent stage of policy formulation and/or alignment. We employ 
a minimal threshold for use of science for policy based on the “interactive” meaning that Weiss 
(1979) gives for knowledge utilization: “It describes a familiar process by which decision 
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makers inform themselves of the range of knowledge and opinion in a policy area” (p. 429). By 
that definition, when congressional staff members consume scientific information in the 
process of becoming—or staying—knowledgeable about an issue, science is being “used.”  
We adopt a typology for information use developed by Whiteman (1985) in his study of 
congressional communication (p. 298): 
 
Substantive – use of information to develop a policy position in the absence of a strong prior 
commitment; 
Elaborative – use of information to extend or refine a position; 
Strategic – use of information to advocate for or reconfirm a position which has already been defined. 
Our study focuses on the two ends of this spectrum—substantive vs. strategic use—because of 
the similarities of the conditions under which elaborative and substantive use occur. In his 
analysis of use of information from the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 
committees, Whiteman (1985) found that 1) strategic use was most common in high-conflict 
issue areas; and 2) substantive and elaborative use occurred predominantly under low-conflict 
conditions. Regardless of the form of use, information producers and users may disagree about 
what makes science usable. Usability is described as “a function of both how science is 
produced (the push side) and how it is needed (the pull side) in different decision contexts” 
(Dilling & Lemos, 2011, p. 681). 
Lemos and colleagues (Lemos et al., 2012) have summarized three main drivers of 
knowledge use: fit, or how users perceive knowledge would meet their needs; interplay, or how 
new knowledge intersects with existing decision routines (negatively and positively); and 
interaction, or how the collaboration between scientists and decision-makers in producing 
knowledge increases its use. The findings from the work of Lemos and colleagues, as well as 
ACF, suggest that the nature of interaction between scientists and policymakers is particularly 
important to the usability of scientific information for policy. What remains unclear is whether 
policymakers differentially preference biased scientific information sources depending on 
whether they are evaluating the landscape of a policy subsystem and or whether they are part 
of one. 
 
RQ3: Does type of information use (strategic vs. substantive) affect the choices of staff members in 
selecting unbiased vs. biased sources? 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We conducted structured interviews with staff members (i.e. staffers) who are employed in the 
personal offices of members of Congress. The names of the staffers were obtained from their 
offices, which identified them as serving as the lead in covering a natural 
resources/environment, energy, or science committee on which the member of Congress sits.  
3.1 Sampling 
The House and Senate each have an energy, natural resources/environment, and science 
committee. The staff that support the work of the members of those committees served as the 
population for the study because of the relevance of science to their portfolios and to limit the 
range of potential issues addressed within the study. In order to include a broad range of 
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offices, the study sample recruitment was stratified to achieve roughly equal proportions from 
four types: House Democrat, House Republican, Senate Democrat, and Senate Republican. 
The recruitment list within each of these groups was randomized; potential respondents were 
contacted systematically by phone and email until the quota of about 4 per group was achieved. 
The relatively small sample number was chosen for two reasons: 1) to conduct longer, more in-
depth interviews to explore the full extent of the study’s research questions; and 2) to restrict 
sampling of the limited study population in the qualitative stage of a two-step research design 
of a broader study of knowledge use in Congress. A second phase of this study (not included in 
this paper) will develop a wider survey of staffers to further explore our research questions. 
3.2 Sample Characteristics 
The study focuses on the use of science by policy staff who develop legislation and advise the 
members of Congress in their personal offices (e.g., not committee staff). All but one of the 
respondents contacted for interviews serve a member of Congress that sits on an energy, 
natural resources/environment, or science committee, but does not either chair the committee 
or serve as ranking member (in the latter cases, majority and minority committee staff are 
employed by, and represent, their respective member of Congress). Due to difficulty in 
recruiting Senate Republican offices during a busy legislative period following the new year, 
one of the Senate Republican staffers interviewed addresses science issues for their member of 
Congress, but the member does not sit on the relevant committee. 
 The final sample was 81% male. It included policy staffers of varying seniority: 
legislative correspondents/aides (3), legislative assistants and senior policy advisors (10), 
counsel (1), and legislative directors (2). The offices were equally split between party 
affiliation, and slightly more weighted toward the House (5 House Republican offices; 4 House 
Democratic offices; 3 Senate Republican offices; 4 Senate Democratic offices). The sample of 
offices was well-distributed across the ideological spectrum, including both highly liberal and 
highly conservative members of Congress (Appendix A).  
3.3 Protocol 
The recruitment materials invited staffers to “discuss how scientific information has—or has 
not—been helpful in the context of [their] work.” The study protocol was approved by George 
Mason University Institutional Review Board [1150984-1]. Sixteen interviews were conducted 
between December 14, 2017 and March 12, 2018. They ranged in length from approximately 
30 minutes to more than one hour. The interview script began with questions about the staffer’s 
educational and professional background, and broad questions about science and its use in 
policy, then moved to a description of current policy issues in the staffer’s portfolio that were 
relevant to the committee. The end of the interview addressed the staffer’s use of science in 
regards to specific issues. Fourteen interviews were audiotaped and transcribed; additional 
notes from the interviews were entered into a database. Notes were taken for the other two 
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3.4 Study Limitations 
This study was conducted for the purposes of determining how congressional staff vet 
scientific information for use in policymaking. The small sample size is suitable for developing 
the range of likely difficulties in the use of science experienced by staffers, including across 
different use contexts, but cannot be generalized to all 535 member offices. While respondents 
do not appear to have selected into the study as a function of office political ideology, there 
may have been a selection bias towards staffers who felt more affiliation with science.   
3.5 Measures 
 
The interview protocol included the following closed- and open-ended measures to address the 
three research questions. Open-ended measures were coded in a process described below; the 
codebook for one of the measures is provided in the appendix. 
[RQ1] Capability of assessing scientific information. To what extent do you feel 
capable of assessing the credibility of scientific information? [Very little–to a great extent] 
Approaches to assess scientist credibility. What approaches in the past have you taken to 
assess the credibility of scientific information? [Codebook, Appendix B] 
[RQ2] Organizations perceived as unbiased. Which organizations come to mind within 
your portfolio on [X committee] as providing scientific information that is both non-partisan 
and politically ideologically unbiased? Perceptions of scientist political bias. Do you think of 
scientists as a politically conservative group, a politically liberal group, or as neither in 
particular? [Conservative, liberal, neither] Preferences for scientist roles. Using a 
categorization developed with natural resource scientists (Steel, Lach, List, & Shindler, 2001), 
we asked interviewees: Which of the five roles do you think is most helpful in informing 
policy processes? Why? [1) Scientists should only report scientific results and leave others to 
make policy decisions. 2) Scientists should report and then interpret the results for others who 
are involved in policy decisions. 3) Scientists should work closely with policymakers and 
others to integrate scientific results in policy decisions. 4) Scientists should actively advocate 
for specific and policies they prefer. 5) Scientists should be responsible for making decisions 
about policy.] Types of organizations perceived as “most helpful.” Which people or 
organizations have been most helpful to you on the scientific aspects of this issue? 
[Categorized by the lead author] 
[RQ3] Strategic and substantive use of science. In the second portion of the study, 
congressional staffers were asked to identify which issues they were working on (What are the 
top 5 major problems that you and others on [X committee] are most occupied with these 
days?). They were asked to categorize them as whether the office policy position was already 
established (For each of these areas, did the office have a clear position on the issue at the start 
of the discussion?), and whether scientific information was relevant (For which—if any—of 
the major problems or project areas you just listed has scientific information come up in either 
your discussions or background reading of issue materials?). Only issues for which scientific 
information was relevant were categorized as “use of science”—these were further divided by 
whether the office had an established position (strategic use), or not (substantive use). In order 
to probe for longer-term policy research projects which might not be currently before the 
committee, staffers were also asked a follow-up question: Are there any additional projects that 
you are currently working on in which you are evaluating policy alternatives on which the 
office doesn’t have a prior position? This response would also indicate examples of substantive 
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use.   
 
3.6 Content Analysis 
 
The variable constructs were coded by 3 people using a codebook developed both from 
previous literature and a close reading of the texts. Coders obtained a Krippendorff’s α of 0.8 
or greater across all variables, measured using a program for intercoder reliability analysis 
developed by Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) (see Appendix B). To ensure consistent 
interpretability across studies, reliabilities of α > 0.800 have been recommended (Krippendorff, 
2004). 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 How do policymakers (congressional staff members) evaluate the credibility of scientific 
sources and information? [RQ1] 
 
Almost all of the interviewed staffers—14 of 15 who answered the question—said they felt 
somewhat or to a great extent capable of assessing the credibility of scientific information. (To 
what extent do you feel capable of assessing the credibility of scientific information?). The 
responses ranged from very little (1), to somewhat (8), and to a great extent (6).  
In a follow-up, they were asked how they assessed the credibility of information (What 
approaches in the past have you taken to assess the credibility of scientific information?). The 
congressional staffers said that they took three types of approaches to vetting scientific 
information (Figure 1, codebook and reliability statistics located in Appendix B). They called 
someone for advice (7 respondents), they looked at the characteristics of the information itself 
(10), and/or they assessed the source of the information (11). Aspects of the social reputation 
of the source—through recommendations from others (7), and assessing their bias (8) and 
expertise (7)—were cited more frequently than checking the way the study was conducted 
(information characteristics/methods, 2). The staff members said that in looking at the 
information itself, they sought to place the information in context: figure out where it stood in 
comparison to other studies (7), locate the original sources of information (4), and assess the 
nature or status of the publication (4). 
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Figure 1. Strategies to assess the 




4.2 What sources of scientific information are seen as unbiased, and how frequently are they 
considered helpful sources of usable information versus biased sources [RQ2] 
 
When asked to identify non-partisan and politically ideologically unbiased sources available to 
them in staffing energy, natural resources, and science committees for their offices, the 
respondents were hard-pressed to name organizations that fit those qualifications. On average 
they specified roughly three, and even acknowledged that some of those sources were biased. 
Approximately a third of respondents (5) directly stated that there are few—if any—unbiased 
sources of scientific information available to them (Appendix, Table 1).  
Half of the respondents (8) cited federal agencies as sources of unbiased scientific 
information; just under half named the Congressional Research Service (7); roughly a third (5) 
universities or colleges; and one-quarter the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine (4). All of the respondents who named Congressional Research Service as an 
unbiased source of information said they used it frequently. Federal agencies, universities and 
colleges, and the National Academies were used more inconsistently. 
Other organizations that were mentioned by just one or two respondents included: 
health and environmental interest groups, science organizations, think tanks, industry 
associations, congressional committees, the Government Accountability Office (a legislative 
support agency), trade press, and academic journal publications. 
For organizations that were named infrequently as unbiased sources—such as think 
tanks and interest groups—the interviewees acknowledged their bias, but that they calculated it 
into their interpretation of the information. As one respondent explained:  
 
For example, I would just say, if you’re hearing from the Brookings organization, they’re obviously a 
think tank, they have an agenda. They are dealing with a level of policy expertise that is credible. But 
you obviously have to provide a little filter on it in a way that you don’t have to as much with for 
example, a National Academy of Sciences study, where you know it has gone through a process of 
academic experts who have reached a conclusion.  
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Some staffers said they tried to balance opposing sources as a strategy to address source 
bias:  
Some will have a certain leaning one way, and some will have a certain leaning the other way, but it’s 
good to get both sides, because you know what counter-arguments might be, or arguments to help your 
side, so I think those are what I get most of my scientific research off of. 
 
Most of the interview respondents (10 out of 15) said that they perceive scientists 
themselves to be politically liberal. The other 5 respondents said “neither” or both. 
Respondents were asked the same question used in the Pew Research Center public surveys 
from 2009 and 2014 (Kennedy & Funk, 2015; Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 
2009): Do you think of scientists as a politically conservative group, a politically liberal group, 
or as neither in particular?  
In follow-up comments to the questions, respondents voiced that 1) science itself 
should be objective; and 2) that the political ideology of scientists—or at least the perception 
of it—had changed in recent decades, becoming more liberal (Appendix D, Table 2). A couple 
of interviewees also discussed perceptions of scientist political ideology within the context of 
the political polarization of universities.  
We asked interviewees how scientists could be most useful to policymakers. “Which of 
the five roles do you think is most helpful in informing policy processes?” and “Why?” All but 
one staff member supported more active roles in policy for scientists than just reporting their 
research findings. Respondents (n=15) were most supportive of scientists working closely with 
policymakers to integrate scientific results in policy decisions (10), followed by reporting and 
then interpreting the results for policymakers (9), and advocating for specific policies (7). We 
asked the staffers to pick one role as more helpful than others, but most (9 of 15) choose more 
than one of the five roles as most helpful, with four saying that all of the roles were 
appropriate. Staffers were generally supportive of scientists playing a wide array of roles in 
policy decisions, but they were divided on whether there were costs in scientists becoming 
issue advocates, e.g. promoting specific policies (Appendix E, Table 3), and acknowledged the 
limitations of the use of scientific information in policy. 
Interview respondents discussed two policy issues in depth—one in which the office 
position was already decided (strategic use, n=15), and one in which it was not (substantive 
use, n=13). We asked them “Which people or organizations have been most helpful to you on 
the scientific aspects of this issue?” Some of the same organizations the interviewees said were 
unbiased sources of information were also repeatedly cited as most helpful—federal agencies 
(12 agency mentions by 5 respondents), and universities and colleges (7 mentions by 6 
respondents) (Figure 2). Other sources of perceived unbiased scientific information—the 
National Academies and Congressional Research Service—were brought up infrequently as 
helpful (once and twice, respectively). 
Environmental interest groups stood out as the most cited helpful organizations, with 
15 mentions by 7 respondents, including across both political parties. In the discussion of non-
partisan sources, two respondents cited environmental interest groups as good sources of 
scientific information but qualified them as partisan leaning and more biased than sources like 
the Congressional Research Service. One of these interviewees stated: 
 
There are some [environmental groups] that I think provide great scientific information, but through a 
partisan lens, and I would put the Union of Concerned Scientists in that group. I find that they rely only 
on credible science, but they very clearly have partisan leanings. They would say that their leanings are 
largely dictated by the science, but I don't think that they’re as good as presenting their findings 
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objectively. I would say Environmental Working Group probably falls in the same bin of scientifically 
rigorous yet partisan. 
 
4.3 Does type of information use (strategic vs. substantive) affect the choices of staff members 
in selecting unbiased vs. biased sources? [RQ3] 
 
Among the 97 policy issues cited by the respondents (n=16) as currently occupying their time, 
energy appeared the most frequently, followed by executive agency oversight, public lands 
management, climate change, and communication and technology. Science use occurred in 
each of the policy issue areas. An average of 6.1 committee issues and research projects were 
listed by the respondents—an average of 3.1 examples of strategic use, 1.8 substantive, and 1.1 
in which scientific information had not been discussed or read. More substantive use occurred 
in long-term policy research than for issues that were currently of interest to the committee. Of 
the 29 total cases of substantive use, 18 were in this exploratory stage (62%). Overall, 52% of 
cited policy issues involved strategic use of science, 30% substantive, and 19% in which 
scientific information was not relevant. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mentions of “helpful” organizations in providing scientific information in cases 
where the office does (strategic use)—or does not (substantive)—already have an established 
policy position. 
The subset of important issues—one strategic and one substantive—discussed in-depth 
with each interviewee closely resembled the distribution of the larger list of policy areas that 
they detailed at the start of the interview as currently of interest to the committee and their 
work. At the top were energy (4 cases of strategic use; 3 of substantive use), climate change (2 
strategic; 2 substantive), and oversight (3 strategic; 0 substantive). Most of the mentions of 
helpful organizations for these important issues occurred in instances of strategic use of 
science, e.g. office policy was already decided. Indeed, 50 of the 78 times that respondents 
cited groups who were useful to them were within the context of strategic use. But strategic 
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and substantive use do not appear to be correlated with certain types of sources (Figure 2). 
Both strategic and substantive use of scientific information occurred within the majority of 
categories of sources, including those most frequently seen as having a bias, such as 
environmental interest groups. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In this study, we use a content analysis of in-depth interviews with staffers (n=16) who support 
their member of Congress’s work on House and Senate science, energy, and natural resource 
committees to illustrate the characteristics of scientific information sources—as credible and/or 
biased—that promote information exchange and use, including in different stages of policy 
adoption.  
Assessing source credibility (RQ1). We find that in assessing source credibility, 
congressional staff members look to the expertise and bias of the authority, which closely 
follows the advice of rhetorical scholars in evaluating the claims of experts (Ehninger & 
Brockriede, 1978). Few respondents report trying to directly assess the methods by which the 
scientific information was obtained. Most look to someone for advice, try to judge the 
credibility of the source, or place the information into wider context.  
Sources seen as biased/unbiased and helpful provision of scientific information (RQ2). 
Similarly following the rhetorical literature, staff members do not necessarily see bias—once 
assessed and understood—as a necessary impediment to credibility. This stands in opposition 
to some of the persuasion literature that defines absence of bias as a prerequisite for credibility 
(Slater & Rouner, 1996), or that ignores its role altogether in the evaluation of credibility 
(McCroskey & Teven, 1999). Staff members can name few sources of scientific information in 
their portfolios (environment/natural resources, energy, science) that they consider unbiased. 
Indeed, about a third said that there were few if any unbiased sources, arguing that everyone 
has a bias when it comes to policy. This hyperawareness—and relative comfort—with 
information source bias illustrates what would be expected from actors who are used to 
working within coalitions of like-minded individuals and organizations, often against groups 
with opposing sets of biases. 
Scientists do not escape being painted with this brush. While scientists are not 
perceived by the public to be politically biased (Kennedy & Funk, 2015), most of the 
respondents believed them as a group to be politically liberal. Even so, the staff members 
stated that scientists should take active roles in policy, up to and including, advocacy. Indeed, 
some of the most helpful sources, such as environmental organizations, are those that staff 
members acknowledge to have a policy or political bias.  
Relationship of type of information use to source bias (RQ3). Most of the helpful 
sources of scientific information identified by respondents were on issues in which the offices 
already had established policy positions. This follows from the theory of legislative subsidy, in 
which lobbyists seek to provide information to offices with shared interests to increase their 
effectiveness. Issues on which an office does not have a position are less likely to be highly 
politicized and at the heart of an adversarial policy subsystem, either because the issue is new, 
or because it has not traditionally been prioritized within a partisan agenda. In these cases, one 
might expect that scientific information sources that are perceived as unbiased would be 
preferred. But if previous contacts serve as the basis for information for offices that are 
exploring nascent issues—at least for them—shared bias might remain the coin of the realm 
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(Ingold et al., 2017). Instead, we find no clear pattern between use of sources by perceptions of 
bias across issues in which offices are developing policy positions, and those in which they 
already have staked ground. One explanation for this might be found in the ways that staff 
members employ scientific information with different audiences. As the field of rhetoric notes, 
expert authority is useful because of its ability to make warranted claims in support of a 
position. Staff members use scientific information to do so, on behalf of their offices, for broad 
audiences that do not necessarily share their political or policy biases. At the same time, they 
must work closely with individuals and organizations that share their policy goals in order to 
successfully promote the interests of the Congress member and their constituents. Information 
sources that are widely perceived as unbiased by a broad public serve the purpose of the 
former, while information sources that share common values and policy preferences serve the 
latter. 
6. CONCLUSION   
Within the specific context of Congress, bias appears to play an important role in the way that 
the credibility of scientific information and its source is ascertained, based on this small 
qualitative study. This may represent a contextual aberration from other persuasive 
communication environments because of the nature of coalitions in promoting policies, based 
on shared values, beliefs, and preferences. Yet, it also may demonstrate the difficulty of 
capturing a variable that has effects that are both absolute (degree of bias), and valenced 
(direction of bias in relationship to the judge), within traditional factor analysis techniques 
(Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979). While there are many challenges in bringing together the varied 
literatures that address credibility, doing so may help elucidate whether indeed it is time to give 
up on standardized measures of trust and credibility after thousands of years, or whether it is 
indeed possible to finally make some headway. 
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Codebook for assessing credibility 
 
Ҡ-α*   
  1. Look at the source (person/organization) 
  Source characteristics 
1.00 a. Look at the source (person/organization), but no additional information 
0.88 
b. Expertise (credentials, intelligence, training, body of work, academic 
background)  
  c. Bias (agenda, motivation, purpose, or interests) key word = bias 
0.82 1. Industry bias 
0.82 
2. Policy bias (looking for policy outcome motivation, or stance on 
policy issues) 
1.00 3. Political bias (political affiliation) 
0.88 4. Funding bias (who commissioned report) 
  2. Look at the information (study, report, article) 
  Information characteristics 
1.00 a. Methods (data collection and analysis within the study) 
0.86 b. Publication (nature of journal/report publication; quality of journals) 
0.84 c. Check original source of information 
1.00 
d. Fit information within the context of other evidence (look at other 
sources) 
1.00 3. Get recommendations from others 
 
* Three graduate student coders conducted the reliability analyses. 
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Table 1. Respondents perceive few sources of unbiased scientific information.   
• “You said politically and ideologically unbiased. I mean there is an argument to be made 
that nobody approaches their work on social issues in a truly unbiased fashion.” 
• “I think it’s hard to find scientific information that’s not being pushed by a non-profit 
group that clearly has some sort of agenda, whether or not it aligns with yours or not, 
basically.” 
• “I think everyone has a bias. That’s generally the way I look at all research and all 
information. I don’t think that there are truly any, there are very few unbiased sources.” 
• “Congressional Research Service is probably the one only that has zero politically sort of 
bias.”  
• “Everybody who comes in here has an agenda. Whether it’s simply to want more money 
for the type of research that they’re doing, or to get us to use the work that they're doing as 
a basis for a different policy decision, or to reinforce a policy decision that we've already 
made. … As our nation becomes more and more partisan, as our policymaking bodies 
become more and more partisan, people have to pick a side. Otherwise, nobody trusts you. 
If it’s us versus them, whose side are you on? You have to pick a side. Otherwise, you have 







Table 2. Respondents say science should be objective, but scientists are perceived as liberal. 
Science • “Science is objective, right? So I hope that scientists are objective.” 
• “I guess neither. I mean, I don’t think science can be political if done 
correctly.” 
• “I think when scientists come in and meet with us, it’s not as sometimes 
people think it’s science is super liberal. It’s not. It’s just science.” 
Scientists • “I think of scientists as usually being progressive … . Mostly in the last 10, 
20 years, I think. I don’t think it was always that way, 50 years ago our 
scientists would have been more conservative … .” 
• “I hope neither, but I think unfortunately politically liberal sometimes. I 
think a lot of times universities are more pushed into the politically liberal 
category, so a lot of science is being done at really great universities, but 
then maybe the scientists themselves aren’t actually ... have any ideology 
one way or another on certain things, but maybe they're being lumped in 













Table 3. Interviewees expressed different opinions on the costs and benefits of advocacy. 




authority of science 
• “[Scientists should say … ] here’s what the facts say. Leave it to 
somebody else to determine what does that mean and how should 
we respond to that. It kind of keeps it above the political fray… and 
doesn’t risk lumping the outcomes of the research in with the more 
partisan happenings here and how that should be addressed. If I’m 
just a scientist and I’ve done a ton of climate change research and 
suddenly I’m here advocating for this policy, I have a lot of 
credibility because of that, but there’s a risk that maybe my 
thoughts on other issues or even my policy work here, and the 
tactics I choose to address that, might drown out some of the 
efficacy of the work I’ve done.” 
• “A side effect of having scientists being the ones lobbying is that 
science then loses its allure as unpolitical. Science is already 
politicized enough. Policymakers need to have better access to 
scientific research in formats that are access(ible), but I don’t 
necessarily think that every scientist needs to be a lobbyist or an 
advocate, too.”  
Everyone lobbying 
the Hill has a policy 
bias; scientists 
should also be 
advocates 
• “… I certainly would prefer for them to be advocates for positions. 
I think that’s more helpful because ... I mean regardless of who 
they are and what the basis is for their decision ... I know that 
everybody has a position on a policy, and I would rather that 
somebody state their position or their organization’s position, and 
tell me whose position it is and why, than for them to attempt to 
maintain some degree of objectivity. .. when I said earlier that I 
spent a lot of time trying to assess the credibility of information, 
part of that is looking at who’s providing the information and 
looking at what perspective they’re coming from. And so I'm gonna 
be doing that anyway and so I think it gets to be more complicated 
if somebody is trying to mask their perspective and providing what 
they perceive to be objectivity.” 
• “The good [lobbyists] are the one who say, ‘I’m here today on 
behalf of this client, let me also bring you some information, that 
isn’t entirely consistent with their position.’ That is how you build 
huge amounts of credibility. It is perfectly acceptable to me, and I 
would welcome if I knew the scientist well enough to have him 
advocate for a policy position. Because to say, here is the evidence, 
let me help you do the work of sorting through these issues, 
because we are not staffed as we used to be to develop the in-house 
expertise. I’m stretched way too thin to do that, so it would be 
helpful.” 
 
